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Abstract 
 
Energy poverty, long considered a problem limited to developing countries only, is now widely 
acknowledged as a challenge for advanced OECD countries as well. How energy poverty is perceived 
depends on the conceptualization and assessment of the underlying phenomena: inappropriately high 
costs for the provision of adequate energy services and/or a resulting push into poverty. In Europe, the 
UK has spearheaded the definition and measurement of such phenomena. The most common way to 
measure energy poverty is to set a 10 percent threshold of energy-related expenditure relative to net 
income. At the time this indicator was being developed, it equaled double the median share of energy 
expenditure relative to the income of all residents. This paper discusses approaches to measuring 
energy poverty and argues that the double median share threshold endorsed by British researchers is 
ill-suited for determining energy poverty. A fixed percentage threshold may be more suitable, 
provided it is empirically confirmed, adequately modified, and regularly updated.    
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Energy poverty (aka fuel poverty) is a problem that is prevalent even in the advanced 
economies of Europe. Inaccessibility or the high cost of energy services have long been a 
predicament of people living in developing countries, but rising energy costs have clearly 
engendered similar challenges for people living in OECD countries. The UK is in the 
vanguard of this cognitive process; hence, this paper is essentially an assessment of the UK’s 
indicators of energy poverty. With the exception of the UK, awareness of energy poverty has 
only recently increased in other EU member states, but primarily with regard to the afflictions 
of eastern European citizens.1 German politicians have been rather reluctant to acknowledge 
that energy poverty might be a problem in their country.2 Rising inequality, as well as 
increasing fuel and electricity prices, are gradually changing politicians’ attitudes, not least 
because the media are linking the emerging energy poverty with the Energiewende, the 
transition to green and renewable energy in Germany. This paper starts from these 
observations. It focuses less on energy poverty in general or on the developing world than it 
does on indicators and definitions of energy poverty for developed OECD countries.3 The 
natural starting point for such an endeavor are indicators from the UK, but the discussion will 
mainly focus on Germany since the paper is a contribution to the BMBF project 
“Sozialpolitische Konsequenzen der Energiewende in Deutschland”.4 The paper’s perspective 
is conceptual and methodological, but it occasionally uses empirical results to consolidate the 
conceptual analysis. Throughout the paper, the term “energy poverty” is preferred over “fuel 
poverty”. The terms are often treated synonymously, though the term “fuel poverty” is 
prevalent in the British debate. However, I argue that “energy poverty” is the more suitable 
term, particularly for the German context. 
 Section 1 covers terminology and preliminary considerations, and introduces four 
methods of measuring energy poverty. Section 2 reviews the most common indicator of 
                                                 
*Corresponding author: Prof. Dr. Rudolf Schüssler, Dept. of Philosophy, University of Bayreuth, email: 
rudolf.schuessler@uni-bayreuth.de, phone: ++49-(0)921-554158, Universitätsstrasse 30, D-95440 Bayreuth, 
Germany. This paper is part of the collaboration between Rudolf Schuessler and the Center for European 
Economic Research (ZEW) under joint research grant ‘SoKo Energiewende’ (Förderkennzeichen 01UN1204E) 
of the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF). I thank Marco Meyer, Philipp Kanschik, 
and the SoKo team for helpful comments. 
1See Bouzarovski et al. (2012), Brunner, K.-M. et al. (2012), Tirado Herrero/Ürge-Vorsatz (2010), 
Thomson/Snell (2012). 
2See Kopatz (2013: 7). 
3For energy poverty concepts for developing countries, see, e.g., Foster et al. (2000), Guruswamy (2011), 
Nussbaumer et al. (2011), Pachauri/Spreng (2003, 2011). I do not seek to find a universal definition of energy 
poverty for developed as well as for developing countries. Such a universal definition can emerge as a result of 
capturing the diverse realities of the energy poor across the globe based on specific definitions. However, at 
present, the situation in individual countries such as the UK or Germany seems to call for a plurality of methods 
to effectively measure energy poverty (see below).  
4The project will be running from August 2013 to July 2016. For more information, see www.zew.de/soko2013. 
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energy poverty, the Ten-Percent-Rule. Section 3 discusses other related indicators such as the 
double median or mean (2M) indicator, and John Hills’ suggestion to use the average 
expenditure to achieve adequate energy services as a threshold for energy poverty. Section 4 
draws conclusions from the preceding discussions by dropping the 2M indicator and 
proposing (simple) refinements of the Ten-Percent-Rule. A major competitor of the Ten-
Percent-Rule, the Low Income, High Cost (LIHC) approach, will be evaluated in another 
paper. 
 
 
 
1. Measuring Energy Poverty: Introductory Considerations  
 
1.1 Discussions on fuel poverty and energy poverty began in the 1970s in response to the oil 
crisis. Although interest in this issue grew gradually, no unified terminology or consensus on 
the nature and definition of fuel or energy poverty has been developed.5 In Europe, only the 
UK has thus far adopted an official approach to measuring fuel poverty. The term “fuel 
poverty” aptly depicts the UK’s focus on heating costs and inefficiencies, insinuating that 
some households are unable to attain adequate room warmth at affordable costs. In fact, a 
preoccupation with room warmth pervades the British debate, though other aspects of 
inadequate provision of energy services are also considered. The official British definition of 
fuel poverty from 2000/2001 explicitly refers to an “adequate standard of warmth” or not 
being able “to keep a home warm at reasonable cost”.6 This is the only energy service 
mentioned in these definitions. 
 By contrast, Boardman (1991/2009) offers a broader definition according to which a 
household is fuel poor if it cannot attain adequate energy services for less than 10 percent of 
its net income.7 Insofar, fuel poverty has become synonymous for energy poverty, if we 
understand energy poverty as a term referring to energy services in general. Unfortunately, 
this understanding of energy poverty is not straightforward. Some authors consider energy 
                                                 
5For a historical overview of British research on fuel poverty, see Berger (2011: 5), Boardman (1991: 1), Moore 
(2012), Liddell et al. (2011: 18), Liddell et al. (2012). I will not systematically discuss the desiderata for a 
concept of energy poverty here. This requires a separate investigation. I will therefore focus on issues related to 
British quantitative methods to measure fuel or energy poverty. 
6In 2000, the definition was announced in the Warm Homes and Energy Conservation Act; in 2001, it was 
specified in the UK Fuel Poverty Strategy (Department of Trade and Industry, 2001). Note that Hills (2012: 29) 
refers to the 2001 definition with adequate energy services as a target. The difference between a warmth-directed 
and an energy services formulation is not significant for the British debate on energy poverty. 
7Boardman (1991: 227; 2009: xv). For another definition of fuel poverty referring to all energy services, see 
Foster et al. (2000: 2). 
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poverty to be a concept describing problems in developing countries, while fuel poverty is 
also prevalent in OECD countries.8 This whole discussion seems moot for the German 
context, where “Energiearmut” translates into both fuel poverty as well as energy poverty. 
 However, a terminological point must be made here. Empirically, problems related to 
house heating may have been at the core of the predicament of the UK’s fuel poor households 
in the past, and will possibly remain so in the future as well. In other countries, particularly in 
Germany, the situation may unfold differently. The Energiewende in Germany has shifted 
public attention away from heating with fossil or renewable fuels to electricity consumption. 
This may appear as a somewhat overblown response, but unless we have reliable data on the 
extent to which electricity consumption contributes to energy poverty, it would be rash to 
discard this perspective. Such data are largely lacking for Germany and the possible reasons 
for this should be considered further. If, as some studies suggest, households at poverty level 
spend up to roughly 40 percent of all housing-related energy costs on electricity (mobility 
costs are usually excluded from consideration), rising consumer prices for electricity 
(presently a reality in Germany) could indeed become significant drivers of energy poverty in 
keeping with the British 10 percent criterion. Against this background, it is problematic to 
lead a discussion on energy prices, energy efficiency and low income with a term that by 
definition focuses our attention on fuel problems.9  
 It therefore seems prudent to use a neutral terminology. As the non-availability and 
costs to achieve adequate energy services represent the core of the problem, whether in terms 
of fuels or other means of energy service provision, energy poverty is an appropriately neutral 
term. Throughout this paper, the term “energy poverty” will hence be preferred over “fuel 
poverty”. 
 
1.2 It is generally acknowledged that there is no single, one-size-fits-all concept for energy 
poverty. As in the case of poverty itself, researchers have to rely on various indicators to 
capture the depth of energy poverty and glean a coherent picture from diverse measurements. 
Moreover, the realities of energy poverty differ across the globe. Phenomena of energy 
poverty diverge considerably between developed and developing, between rich and poor 
countries, as well as between different climatic zones. In the following, concepts of energy 
poverty for OECD countries will be analyzed (in fact, only for middle to high latitude 
countries of the OECD, and in particular for Germany). Research on energy poverty in the 
                                                 
8See Liddell et al. (2011: 64). 
9Arguments with phrases such as “as the term implies” are used in the British debate on the definition of fuel 
poverty (see Moore et al., 2011: 5). 
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EU, and most prominently in the UK, provides the natural starting point for this endeavor. 
The disclaimer that concepts of energy poverty only exist in the plural still remains valid 
under these restrictions. At the present level of research, there is no palpable ‘best’ concept of 
energy poverty, even for individual countries like Germany.     
 We will therefore first examine groups of indicators for which a comparatively close 
affiliation with energy poverty appears plausible and which have been proposed in prior 
empirical research in Europe:10 
 
(1) Subjective qualitative assessments by affected persons (e.g., “I cannot afford to 
      heat my rooms adequately”); 
(2) Subjective qualitative assessments by others (e.g., social workers);  
(3) Objective non-expenditure-based indicators (e.g., humidity, incidence of mold in 
      housing, epidemiological data); 
(4) Expenditure-based indicators (e.g., income share of energy expenditure). 
  
 
Ideally, all these indicators should play a role in the assessment of energy poverty. It is 
particularly important to take account of the information derived from indicators (1)–(3). As 
will become clear, expenditure-based indicators, and not least the notion of adequate energy 
services, require calibration in order to provide reasonable and reliable empirical information 
about energy poverty. This is virtually impossible without taking account of indicators (1)–
(3). At the same time, however, a conceptual analysis can tell us something about the 
suitability of certain quantitative instruments to measure energy poverty. For this reason, I 
will critically evaluate familiar quantitative, expenditure-based definitions of energy poverty. 
 Research on energy poverty has been ongoing in the UK for quite some time and has 
produced competing expenditure-based indicators: 
 
- The Ten-Percent-Rule (Boardman 1991, 2009) 
- Double Median or Mean indicator (Boardman 1991, Hills 2012) 
- Low Income, High Cost (LIHC) indicator (Hills 2012) 
- Minimal-Standard indicator (Moore 2012). 
 
                                                 
10For an analysis of energy poverty in EU countries with subjective and multi-dimensional standards, see also 
Bouzarovski (2012), Buzar (2007), Healy (2004), Healy/Clinch (2004).   
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The Ten-Percent-Rule (TPR) and Double Median indicators share a common history. 
However, I argue that they can and should be differentiated. Both indicators define energy 
poverty as excess spending on energy beyond a certain threshold, most prominently, a ten 
percent share or double median share of energy expenditure for all households relative to net 
income. By contrast, the LIHC indicator assumes that energy poverty (in OECD countries) 
refers to poverty caused by the costs for adequate energy services. The LIHC indicator 
maintains that households are energy poor if the costs to achieve adequate energy services 
push them below the threshold of poverty, and if the energy costs of these households are 
higher than those of the median household. Minimal standard approaches are also based on a 
given poverty line. They add up minimally adequate consumption requirements and compare 
the sum to a household’s income. All of the mentioned indicators have their proponents, and it 
therefore is worthwhile to explore them in detail. In this paper, I will assess the TPR and 
Double Median (or Mean) indicators. A discussion of LIHC and minimum standard indicators 
will follow in another paper. 
I will also postpone the discussion on follow-up concepts, such as the depth of energy 
poverty. In poverty research, the incidence and depth of poverty are usually represented by 
different indicators. For instance, the former refers to households that fall short of the poverty 
threshold, whereas the latter is measured by the household’s distance to the poverty line. 
Since the depth of poverty in this example and for the discussed indicators of energy poverty 
depends on the indicator selected, a conceptual analysis of the indicator has to precede the 
development of a depth metric (which thereafter is often merely a technical problem). The 
same is true for an equivalence scale for households of different sizes, household occupancy, 
or deducting rent from the considered income. Such factors are important for the application 
of indicators of energy poverty, but they play a role for all quantitative indicators and are 
therefore secondary for a basic assessment of the indicators’ merits.     
 
1.3 Quantitative, expenditure-based indicators of energy poverty (such as those discussed in 
this paper) primarily rely on three variables: energy efficiency, energy prices, and household 
income.11 Energy efficiency is often thought to provide the key to an appropriate distinction 
of energy poverty from general poverty. In OECD countries, poverty thresholds depend on 
income. However, energy poverty as conceived by the concepts of Sections 2–3 does not stop 
at a poverty line (or at a particular income level). Even at higher incomes, people may spend 
too much of their net income on energy services if those same services could be obtained at a 
                                                 
11These variables may be specified in more detail (see Liddell 2011: 3), and household or apartment occupancy 
may arguably be relevant, too. Nevertheless, the three factors mentioned are those discussed most widely.   
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lower cost through increased energy efficiency. Hence, reasonable costs for energy services 
depend to no small extent on energy efficiency. Improving energy efficiency is therefore a 
major political aim in the fight against energy poverty. This aim gains further weight still 
through the fight against global warming which places restrictions on adequate energy 
consumption as long as it remains linked to greenhouse gas emissions. Energy efficiency is 
thus a key to the mitigation of global warming.  
 Against this background, energy prices are not always considered as important for 
energy poverty as is energy efficiency. This leads to a conventional criticism of the UK’s 
official energy poverty indicator in the period 2001–2013 (discussed in Section 2). The 
criticism alleges that the indicator is overly sensitive to fuel price changes. Since the role of 
price changes bears on questions of energy poverty in general – and drives German interest in 
the notion of energy poverty – it seems sensible to discuss this criticism before turning to 
specific indicators. At first glance, there seem to be some strong political reasons to focus on 
energy efficiency instead of prices. After all, governments can influence the energy efficiency 
of buildings or technologies, but cannot manipulate world market prices for fuels or the 
production costs of energy. However, energy and fuel prices are regulated, subsidized and 
often heavily taxed Hence, energy prices for consumers are, in principle, no less subject to 
political decisions than the energy efficiency of buildings, and it is by no means implausible 
to investigate the impact of politically motivated price changes on energy poverty.          
 In any case, energy prices are at least conceptually as important for quantitative, 
expenditure-based indicators of energy poverty as is energy efficiency. All these indicators 
represent energy poverty as a problem of excess expenditure on energy. Expenditure is the 
product of a consumed quantity (influenced by energy efficiency) multiplied with price. Prima 
facie, there is hence nothing wrong with an energy poverty indicator that is sensitive to energy 
prices. In fact, it is plausible to assume that rising energy prices will ceteris paribus cause 
more energy poverty. It cannot even be excluded that rising energy prices could cause an 
over-proportional increase in energy poverty in a given country. This is a warning to not 
methodologically discriminate against price-sensitive indicators of energy poverty for 
political reasons. 
 However, there is a problem with price sensitivity in the UK’s long-standing indicator 
in comparison with sensitivity to income (see below). This problem should not be 
misunderstood as a problem of price sensitivity as such. It arises because increases in income 
do not compensate for increases in price of the same absolute amount.12 In effect, this means 
                                                 
12See Moore (2012: 22) 
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that an indicator’s price sensitivity may be a problem in middle or high income ranges. It is 
not immediately clear, however, whether this is a generally disabling problem for the 
indicator or for its indiscriminate application at all income levels. The significance of this 
aspect will become clear in the paper. Ex ante, at least, the sensitivity of energy poverty 
indicators to energy prices and energy efficiency should be treated as an open question, 
provided that both play a significant role.     
 
 
 
2. The Ten-Percent-Rule 
 
2.1 Persons are energy poor according to the Ten-Percent-Rule (TPR) if they (have to) spend 
more than ten percent of their net income on adequate energy services. The TPR became 
prominent through Brenda Boardman’s work on energy poverty and was the UK’s official 
indicator of energy poverty from 2001 to 2013.13 One of the great advantages of the TPR is its 
simplicity, public communicability, and apparent pragmatic versatility. However, appearances 
can be deceptive.14 Data sets on income and household spending often contain easily 
extractable information on actual spending for energy services. Equally often, it is neither 
easily possible to determine the precise nature of the services nor the adequacy of energy use 
with the data in question. It is therefore tempting to apply the TPR with respect to actual 
energy spending (TPRact) instead of looking at adequate energy services.15 Empirical studies 
show that this modification leads to the assumption of very high levels of energy poverty in 
Germany. The share of the energy poor households in 2011 in Germany would be above 25 
percent.16 This figure seems suspiciously high, although one should hesitate to rule it out on a 
priori grounds. Comparisons with other energy poverty indicators confirm TPRact as an outlier 
for Germany.17 We arrive at the same result when we apply plausibility checks using 
subjective indicators of energy poverty. Of the households at risk of poverty in Germany, 17 
                                                 
13See Boardman (1991: 227, 2009: xv) for the definition of fuel poverty as “not having adequate energy services 
for (less than) 10 percent of income”. As mentioned, the official criterion refers to adequate warmth instead of 
adequate energy services. I will not elaborate here on this difference, although it would lead to a higher threshold 
for more inclusively defined energy poverty. The reasons for assuming a particular threshold need to be 
reconsidered, anyway.   
14A point emphasized by Hills (2011: 102). 
15Waddams Price et al. (2012) have done this, and E-Control (2013: 14) suggests it for pragmatic reasons, but 
see the detailed counterarguments of Liddell et al. (2011: pp. 67). 
16Heindl (2013: 20).  
17Heindl (2013: 20). 
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percent feel that they are unable to adequately heat their rooms.18 Such a percentage of 
(almost) poor households suggests that much fewer than a quarter of all households will be 
energy poor in total. On the other hand, household energy consultants confirm that many 
German households at the median income level spend around ten percent of their net income 
on energy and are thus at risk of becoming energy poor.19 It is easily conceivable that half of 
these (or poorer) households could in fact be energy poor. It is also possible, however, that 
energy consultants base their risk assessment of becoming energy poor on TPRact. In this case, 
the validation of TPRact would rely on a circular argument.  
 In light of these problems, we should take a closer look at the initial justifications for 
the TPR. In 1988, the year of reference for Boardman (1991), the TPR represented the actual 
average share of energy spending among the 30 percent poorest households in Great Britain 
as well as roughly twice the median share of actual energy spending for all households.20 
There is, of course, not necessarily a nexus between these two sources of the TPR. In fact, 
British researchers widely accept the double median share as a guiding consideration, whereas 
proximity to poor households’ actual average spending is regarded as mere coincidence.21 
(This interpretation substantiates criticism of the UK’s official decision in 2001 to peg the 
criterion of energy poverty at an outdated 10 percent value.) It is one of the main claims of the 
present paper that this orthodoxy of understanding the TPR is wrong. The justification for the 
TPR should rely on energy expenditure at the lowest income strata and not on the overall 
double median share of an entire country’s energy expenditure. Serious methodological 
problems with double median indicators, as outlined in Section 3, confirm this claim. 
Presently, I will proceed with a normative justification of the TPR (or similar fixed percentage 
rules). Average spending at low incomes has, of course, no immediate normative import, but 
normative considerations are necessary because poverty thresholds specify which households 
require support.   
 
2.2 In the UK, normative considerations enter the debate on energy poverty via the notion of 
expenditure to achieve adequate energy services. Adequacy is a normative concept. The 
calculation in the UK is based on ‘modelled bills’ rather than on actual spending. A modelled 
bill is an idealized and homogenized instrument for comparing the energy needs of diverse 
                                                 
18Kopatz (2013: 64). 
19Kopatz (2013: 74). 
20Boardman (1991). 
21See Hills (2012: 30), Moore et al. (2011: pp. 19), Moore (2012: 21), Liddell et al (2012: 27) for a 2M measure 
instead of a fixed percentage-rule. Liddell et al. (2011: pp. 81) indicate that Boardman has accepted the double 
median as a guiding principle. The EU has also moved in the direction of 2M measures, see European 
Commission (2010: 10). 
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households. Expenditure modeling and the assessment of adequacy are rife with value 
judgments and open to moral disagreement. It is common practice to achieve political action 
despite normative disagreements (in particular, disagreements that cannot be settled by open 
discussion) through political decision procedures. Insofar, the official adoption of a 
methodology by the UK government to determine adequate energy services conveyed 
normative legitimacy to the methodology in question. Note that this legitimacy is not merely 
political, but to some extent also morally legitimate, because it is a moral desideratum to fight 
energy poverty (and poverty in general), despite reasonable normative disagreements about its 
precise nature.22 However, such assurances do not preclude criticism of a methodology which 
in particular has implications for future legislation or official standards. It is therefore 
noteworthy that adequacy in the British understanding mainly refers to adequate room 
warmth. It is reasonable to postulate respective standards (e.g., 21° C) for all households, 
regardless of income, because they relate to health. The same is not true for adequacy 
standards for electricity consumption or home size. Such factors may vary considerably with 
income, and it is reasonable to assume that higher electricity consumption and more space are 
adequate for higher income households. Standards of adequacy for all levels of income and all 
types of energy services are thus highly contentious (and remind some observers of sumptuary 
laws). On the other hand, the mitigation of global warming may require standards for 
adequate energy services to be defined for all. How the arising normative tensions between 
pluralism, individual freedom, and ecological responsibility ought to be handled, and 
presumably also be mitigated, cannot be discussed here.23 They do, however, tell us that 
normative justifications of the TPR for low and high incomes are distinct issues.     
 For lower incomes, an energy cost allowance within the scope of a welfare program 
provides a possible normative basis for the TPR (or, in any case, a regularly updated fixed 
percentage rule) as an approximate and pragmatic standard for energy poverty. This is 
particularly the case if such allowances are based on a minimum consumption basket for the 
households in question, as in the MIS approach in the UK. In Germany, the energy cost 
allowance for ALG II/Sozialhilfe (welfare assistance) recipients is difficult to determine in this 
respect. Its formulation repeatedly refers to the adequacy of allowances and payments, but its 
calibration mainly relies on empirically measured averages. Presently, there is a lack of data 
                                                 
22Among philosophers, much more ought to be said about normative problems when dealing with reasonable 
disagreements and about the different perspectives of involved normative legitimacy. However, I will spare the 
reader these ramifications. 
23Such a discussion should include the doctrine of eco-sufficiency. Eco-sufficientarians argue for lifestyles that 
require low levels of energy consumption, assuming that the survival of the human species will otherwise be in 
jeopardy. An attempt to specify adequate energy consumption for all income levels might suit this view. 
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on a nationwide assessment of the cleft between acknowledged adequacy and actual 
expenditure, above all for heating. Whether the TPR is a good proxy for a normative TPRadeq 
or not (with regard to adequate energy services) for German welfare recipients cannot be said. 
In any case, if the TPR is used as a pragmatic indicator of energy poverty, e.g, to establish a 
baseline for assessing changes in energy poverty, presumed or methodically constructed 
adequacy for low income households should be the underlying reason. The TPR will then 
roughly reflect an acceptable government specification of a reasonable share of income spent 
on energy at the welfare level, which means that it does not have to coincide with an overall 
double median share. 
 Of course, judgments of adequacy may change and it seems reasonable to adapt 
welfare allowances to altered circumstances or conditions in different regions or countries. It 
would therefore be wrong to assume that the value of 10 percent is written in stone. The TPR 
may give way to other percentage rules, and perhaps it was indeed unwise to adopt a rule in 
2001 based on data for 1988. However, it makes sense to retain the TPR as a baseline for 
OECD countries if the share of energy allowances at welfare level in different countries and 
over time varies around the 10 percent threshold.24 
 
2.3 The calculation of allowances is fraught with difficulties and it may thus appear tempting 
to use a population’s double median share of energy expenditure as a standard for adequate 
energy expenditure at the welfare level. However, Section 3 will show that this is not a good 
idea. The practice of assessing households’ basic energy needs in detail and how to determine 
adequate warmth is methodologically far better and more in line with normative entitlements 
to basic goods or capabilities.25 Of course, the suggested justification of the TPR has its price. 
As already indicated, anchoring the TPR at the level of welfare assistance creates problems 
for its application at higher income levels. This can also be demonstrated by some 
straightforward considerations. Clearly, households with much higher incomes will not fall 
into poverty if they spend more than 10 percent of their income on energy. This insight has 
led Hills (2012) to resort more directly to a cost-push indicator for energy poverty.26 It is 
instructive to show how quickly TPRact loses relevance with this alternative approach if 
incomes increase. Let us look at the amount of disposable income after deducting the costs for 
                                                 
24The value of 10 percent does not have to be the modus, median, or mean of the distribution of such data. It 
suffices if it is the closest round and salient number, a consideration that is buttressed by the requirement of 
having a publicly communicable threshold of energy poverty.  
25For these normative entitlements, see Alkire (2002), Comim et al. (2008), and with respect to energy poverty, 
Schweiger (2013). 
26As mentioned, LIHC and MIS measures will be discussed in a separate paper. 
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adequate energy services of a welfare recipient who collects EUR 900 (including for rent, 
heating, and electricity). If 10 percent of the welfare recipient’s total disposable income 
covers the costs of adequate energy services, he or she should be left with EUR 810. A EUR 
950 household would be left with the same amount of disposable income if it spent 
approximately 15 percent of its income on energy costs, and a EUR 1,000 household would 
have to spend more than 19 percent of its income. Both incomes are still well below the 
German median household income of around EUR 1,400 for 2012. 
 This provides further indication that a normative justification of TPR for higher 
incomes will be difficult to come by. Yet these difficulties do not impugn the TPR as such. It 
suggests applying the TPR to lower income ranges only and to presume that energy poverty 
for higher incomes is only a reality for particularly vulnerable households. Hills (2012) opts 
for a low-income presumption, which can be introduced in a different way in the TPR by 
weighing the rule inversely with income, assuming an income cut-off point27 or some other 
suitable refinement. I will return to these suggestions in Section 5. Hence, the TPR could 
(empirical studies pending) be applied as a simple and suitable indicator of energy poverty. 
Without a refinement, the TPR is probably too unreliable.  
 
 
 
3. M and 2M Indicators 
 
3.1 The TPR initially represented double the median share of household energy spending 
relative to income. This raises the question whether double median indicators can serve as 
indicators of energy poverty in their own right. Actually, the question should be understood as 
including further indicators as discussed by Heindl (2013): 
 
- Double the median household expenditure on energy    
- Double the mean household expenditure on energy 
- Double the median share of household expenditure on energy 
- Double the mean share of household expenditure on energy. 
 
                                                 
27Hill repeatedly mentions the idea of a cut-off point for the TPR (Hills 2011: 106, Hills 2012: 40), but 
apparently, no in-depth investigations have followed. 
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This set of indicators results from the fact that median (or mean) expenditure and the median 
(or mean) share of expenditure are not always sufficiently differentiated in the research on 
energy poverty. Only the double median share relates to the TPR, but arguably, the other 
indicators might bear some significance with respect to energy poverty, too. Hence, Heindl 
includes them in his analysis and shows that they lead to significantly different results for a 
German data set. I will call this family ‘2M-indicators’ to denote their dependency on 
statistical medians or means.  
 Furthermore, Hills (2012) uses a median indicator as a threshold in his two-tiered 
criterion for energy poverty. Spending more (for a modelled bill) on energy services than the 
population’s overall median is a precondition for being energy poor according to Hills. Hills’ 
preference for median expenditure is already an implicit criticism of 2M’s view of energy 
poverty, because he uses the median expenditure and not the double median expenditure share 
as a threshold for unreasonable energy expenditure. Nevertheless, I will first discuss the 
rationale behind a median expenditure threshold before proceeding to a critique of 2M 
indicators. 
 Hills justifies his threshold with the argument that “it is unreasonable for low-income 
households to have to pay more to keep warm than typical households on much higher 
incomes”.28 This consideration seems plausible, indeed. Yet it does not follow that 
expenditure up to the median should therefore be considered reasonable for low-income 
households. The insight that eating more than five steaks in a row would be unreasonable 
does not imply that eating four is reasonable. Hence, treating the median of (modelled) 
expenditure as a threshold has to be justified on additional grounds, and other researchers 
object that requiring poor households to spend up to the median already overburdens them. 
This objection needs empirical validation, but so does Hills’ threshold, and it is noteworthy 
that several British experts on energy poverty endorse the objection and that the Scottish 
government has repudiated Hills’ approach for this very reason.29 
 
3.2 It is quite difficult to invest the median of energy expenditure with normative meaning, 
and the task is not facilitated by moving to twice the median. Why should we accept the 
double median share of energy expenditure as a normative threshold of energy poverty (on 
problems of its use as an empirical proxy, see below)?30 There is apparently nothing in the 
                                                 
28See Hills (2012: 53). 
29See the criticism of Moore et al (2011: 17) and the Scottish Fuel Poverty Forum (2012). 
30Several authors have remarked on the arbitrariness of a double median share threshold, see E-Control (2013: 
10), Hills (2012: 30). 
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double median that singles it out for this role. Imagine a wealthy household that spends more 
than the overall double median share on energy. Why should we consider that household 
energy poor? The household might be spending a lot on lighting a park-like garden at night. 
Of course, a 2M indicator gains in plausibility if it is linked to adequate energy services. It 
may seem that households which need to spend more than twice the median share of all other 
households on adequate energy services are, in all likelihood, overburdened. However, this 
only applies if “adequate” means adequate for poor or average citizens (see the considerations 
in Section 2). The Queen may, in fact, spend more than twice the British median share for 
energy services, but she probably spends it on energy services that are adequate for a Queen 
and hence is not energy poor.31 This raises the question whether the standard for adequacy 
ought to be modified at higher income levels, which, prima facie, seems plausible. The higher 
a household’s income, the higher (and more expensive), prima facie, are adequate energy 
services. 
 Even without such considerations, 2M indicators are subject to the same objection as 
Hill’s median criterion. Higher income shares may plausibly be too much of a burden for 
average citizens, but it does not follow that shares up to 2M are therefore in order. 
Independent reasons are necessary for this assumption, and it is interesting that apparently no 
sustained conceptual argument exists in the literature on energy poverty for the double median 
share, including by the proponents of a 2M interpretation of the TPR. They emphasize that the 
TPR was intended as a 2M rule, but do not provide good arguments why the double median is 
an appropriate threshold. Reference to the double median share apparently goes all the way 
back to an early discussion paper of Isherwood and Hancock (1979), which is difficult to 
come by. In any case, it is difficult to find a critical assessment of the reasons that led 
Isherwood, Hancock and subsequent researchers to favor the double median share – except 
for its link to the TPR. This renders considering the double median share as an underlying 
threshold for energy poverty problematic. 
 Of course, coincidence with the TPR ensures that the double median share is 
empirically equivalent as a threshold for energy poverty. Hence, despite their lacking 
normative justification, 2M indicators may serve as proxies for a fixed percentage threshold if 
a sufficiently high empirical correlation exists between both indicators. Diverging empirical 
results for the TPR and 2M indicators, nevertheless, suggest that such a proxy relationship 
                                                 
31On the Queen and energy poverty, see the article “Soaring prices push Queen close to ‘fuel poverty’” in the 
Financial Times 20. 10. 2011. 
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does not exist,32 and there are further methodological reasons to reject 2M indicators of 
energy poverty, to which I will now turn.       
 First, most researchers agree that a double median indicator is better than a double 
mean indicator for energy poverty. One reason is that the mean is more sensitive to outliers or 
habit changes in the upper or lower ranges of a distribution. The mean share of energy 
spending increases if wealthy consumers begin driving more SUVs. Hence, the share of 
energy poor in a society will decrease without any change in the consumption habits or 
spending of the poor. A median-based indicator can circumvent this effect.  
 Another reason for preferring the median is a moral one. Empirical distributions of 
energy expenditure or the income share spent on energy services are usually right-skewed 
(like a log-normal distribution). In most right-skewed distributions, the median precedes the 
mean. Using the median as an indicator is thus favorable to households that might be energy 
poor. If we wonder whether the median or the mean is the more appropriate indicator, the 
median gives low income, high cost consumers the benefit of the doubt. Theories of justice 
suggest that this is in order. Rawls’ difference principle and more generally principles of 
prioritarian concern for people who are worse off, demand an allocation of burdens and 
benefits in favor of persons who are relatively worse off.33 Median indicators of energy 
poverty fit this demand, while mean-based indicators do not.              
 
3.3 This is not to say that the double median is an appropriate indicator, because it remains 
unclear why it should be an indicator of energy poverty at all. In fact, double median 
indicators of energy poverty have some awkward properties. Adding a constant to an 
otherwise unchanged distribution will reduce the number of households above the double 
median in right-skewed distributions.34 This means that adding a fixed cost to the energy 
expenditure of all households could ceteris paribus reduce the number of energy poor – an 
utterly counter-intuitive result. It seems wrong to use an indicator of energy poverty, which 
implies that it is possible to reduce the number energy poor households by making everybody 
pay an additional fixed sum for energy services. This effect signals a violation of Sen’s 
monotonicity requirement for poverty measures. According to this widely accepted 
                                                 
32See Heindl (2013), Liddell (2012: 28).  
33See Clayton/Williams (2004), Gosepath (2007) for theories on social or distributive justice. Walker/Day 
(2012), Schweiger (2013) have offered a first interpretation of energy poverty. 
34Without normalization, the respective distributions provide different information under a transformation of 
scale. Normalization has the undesired effect of re-introducing the mean as a key measure. 
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requirement, poverty rises when a poor person’s income drops.35 With double median 
expenditure indicators it is the other way round.   
 Unfortunately, this is also a problem for the double median expenditure share 
indicator. For uniform income (all earn the same), adding a constant to energy expenditure is 
tantamount to adding this constant divided by income to the expenditure share. Hence, the 
distribution of expenditure shares moves by a constant to the right, but double the constant 
has to be added to the old double median. The number of households (or cases) above the new 
double median will therefore decrease. This means that Sen’s monotonicity requirement is 
violated in such cases as well. 
 Now, let all have the same energy costs at varying incomes and add a constant to 
energy costs. All have higher energy expenditure under these premises, but the number of 
households above the double median in the distribution of energy expenditure shares remains 
constant.36 Again, the monotonicity requirement is violated.    
 These are, of course, simple thought experiments. They are only immediately 
significant for research on energy poverty if one accepts that indicators of energy poverty 
should not violate conditions commonly accepted for poverty measurement, and which are 
above all commonsensical. Under this methodological premise, an indicator for x (say, an 
increase of poverty or temperature) that signals the opposite (a decrease in poverty or 
temperature) in a plausible thought experiment in which x should rise is already, for this 
reason, inacceptable. Some hard-nosed empiricists might nevertheless want to ignore such 
problems as long as an indicator functions reasonably well under observed conditions. Hence, 
a counter-intuitive result under counter-factual conditions remains irrelevant because none of 
these assumptions fits social reality or can be expected to fit social reality in the near future. I 
do not think, however, that this escape route works. The fixed-increment thought experiment 
suggests that general increases in expenditure can lead to less energy poverty according to the 
double median share indicator even in practice. This effect depends on the median income and 
the share of energy expenditure at the median income level, the depth of energy poverty, the 
variance of expenditure shares, and other variables. Models can be built to demonstrate this.37 
Usually, we will not know enough about social reality to ensure that the double median share 
indicator does not backfire. Precisely for this reason, we cannot trust the indicator. It might 
                                                 
35See Sen (1976), Zheng (1997: 131). 
36In this scenario, the distribution of expenditure shares is stretched along the x-axis through a multiplication 
with 1+c/K. (c = increment; K = basic expenditure). Let a* be the original median share. Hence, for the new 
double median share, we use: (2a*)(1+c/K) = 2 [a*(1+c/K)]. The transformed old double median is twice the 
transformed new median. 
37A publication with simulations of cost variations for German social panel data is presently being prepared. 
Preliminary calculations show which variables influence the level of energy poverty for 2M indicators.  
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signal a decrease of energy poverty although the burdens of energy expenditure have 
increased for all citizens, so that energy poverty in any reasonable understanding of the 
concept cannot possibly have decreased.        
  
 
 
4. Conclusion and Refinements of the Ten-Percent-Rule 
 
4.1 Section 3 contains what I consider strong arguments against 2M indicators of energy 
poverty. Double median standards appear arbitrary, but that is not the worst that can be said 
about them. The added-fixed-cost problem and the non-monotonicity of their relationship 
with energy poverty (plausibly conceived) should suffice to disqualify double median 
standards from consideration as indicators of energy poverty. The flexibility of median-based 
concepts in comparison with fixed percentage rules, which have to be monitored and re-
researched from time to time, offers no compensation for these shortcomings. 
 In general, the construction and application of energy poverty indicators has to 
confront two familiar types of errors: false positives and false negatives. False positives are 
cases in which households are considered energy poor, although they are not. This type of 
error presumably occurs most at the upper ranges of the income scale. Moreover, empirical 
studies suggest that this type of error increases rather rapidly with income, particularly in 
OECD countries. In these countries, spending too much on energy does not lead to poverty in 
any intuitive sense for middle to high income households. False negatives are cases in which 
households are not considered energy poor although they are. This error prevails at the lower 
income ranges. Theories of justice call for an avoidance of false negatives over false 
positives. Hence, thresholds for energy poverty should not risk excluding energy poor 
households even at the cost of including some households that are not energy poor. Many 
suggested median standards violate this requirement. They peg a threshold at a point where all 
observers readily agree that energy poverty applies. However, setting a threshold at a point 
where universal agreement is reached discriminates against those households that are only 
probably, but not definitely, energy poor. 
 Giving theories of justice their due may, of course, be costly and politically difficult. 
Yet this does not imply that median indicators need to be reinstated. It is also possible to fight 
false positives by excluding higher income households from consideration (unless they are 
particularly vulnerable). I suggest applying this strategy to the TPR (or a related fixed 
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percentage rule) based on an adequate energy allowance at the level of welfare assistance. It 
needs to be taken into account that a 10 percent share of income for adequate energy services 
apparently becomes ceteris paribus rapidly misleading as incomes rise (see the considerations 
in Section 2). However, it is an empirical question how rapidly this effect sets in, which in 
any case might be tempered by an increased need for energy above the welfare level. It is thus 
impossible to validate an appropriate cut-off point for such considerations without empirical 
research, but it may be reasonable to look for one. 
 
4.2 A cut-off point is not the only possibility to refine the application of the TPR. Following 
the methodological principle that complexity should increase only sparingly and not more 
than necessary (a corollary of Ockham’s razor), empirical studies should examine whether 
they can achieve satisfactory results with the following simple refinements of the TPR: 
 
 (a) Capped TPR 
 (b) Weighted TPR 
 (c) Capped and weighted TPR. 
 
Capped TPR embodies the desideratum of avoiding false positive results. Ideally, the cap 
should be set so that it can, prima facie, reasonably be assumed that wealthier households are 
not energy poor. This requires calibration. Statistical correlations, subjective indicators of 
energy poverty, or the judgments of social workers may help place a suitable cap on the TPR. 
The cap should be placed generously. Theories of justice recommend leaning toward 
overestimation of energy poverty under uncertainty rather than toward underestimation. 
Accordingly, it should be fairly obvious which households lie above the cut-off point and are 
not really energy poor unless they are particularly vulnerable38 or unless specific reasons for 
an assumption of energy poverty exist.          
 Weighted TPR asserts that the number of false positives will increase gradually with 
income. Hence, it might be helpful to multiply the cases that exceed the TPR threshold with a 
weighting factor aTPR. The factor has the value aTPR = 1 at the level of welfare assistance, and 
then falls monotonously following a plausible function. One problem with this suggestion is 
                                                 
38Elderly people that live in houses that are too big come to mind as vulnerable, or single parents. It is indeed a 
normative problem whether senior citizens should be asked to leave apartments or houses that are too spacious, 
considering that these were their homes for decades. If senior citizens are entitled to stay in their homes, 
adequate energy services for them ought to include heating, lighting and warm water. Even senior citizens who 
are relatively well-off could become energy poor if they can no longer bear the costs of adequate energy services 
for their homes without inadequate restrictions. 
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that the weighting function appears arbitrary unless it is guided by some further 
considerations of energy poverty. A remedy might consist in (c) which combines (a) and (b). 
The cap for the TPR represents an income cut-off point above which energy poverty is very 
unlikely. If we find reasons for such a cap, it becomes a natural end-point for a weight 
reduction. Hence, aTPR may assume the value of 1 at the level of welfare assistance and 
monotonously fall to 0 (or a positive value < 1) at the cut-off point. Whether these simple 
modifications of the TPR bring reasonable results needs to be empirically validated. 
 Last but not least, my plea for a refined TPR (or fixed percentage rule) should not be 
understood as a plea against (modified) LIHC and MIS indicators or against subjective 
considerations. All these approaches may be informative with respect to energy poverty in 
OECD countries and in Germany in particular. Nevertheless, retaining the TPR might prove 
helpful because the rule is simple and suited for political communication. Capping it does not 
add much complexity, but will improve its message.  
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